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Abstract
The approach to proof search dubbed “coinductive proof search”, and previously developed
by the authors for implicational intuitionistic logic, is in this paper extended to polarized
intuitionistic logic. As before, this includes developing a coinductive description of the search
spaces generated by a sequent, an equivalent inductive syntax describing the same space, and
decision procedures for inhabitation problems in the form of predicates defined by recursion
on the inductive syntax. The polarized logic can be used as a platform from which proof
search for other logics is understood. We illustrate the technique with LJT, a focused sequent
calculus for full intuitionistic propositional logic (including disjunction). For that, we have to
work out the “negative translation” of LJT into the polarized logic (that sees all intuitionistic
types as negative types), and verify that the translation gives a faithful representation of proof
search in LJT as proof search in the polarized logic.
1 Introduction and Motivation
An approach to proof search dubbed “coinductive proof search” has been developed by the authors
[EMP13, EMP16]. The approach is based on three main ideas: (i) the Curry-Howard paradigm of
representation of proofs (by typed λ-terms) is extended to solutions of proof-search problems (a
solution is a run of the proof search process that, if not completed, does not fail to apply bottom-
up an inference rule, so it may be an infinite object); (ii) two typed λ-calculi are developed for
the effect, one being obtained by a co-inductive reading of the grammar of proof terms, the other
being obtained by enriching the grammar of proof terms with a formal fixed-point operator to
represent cyclic behaviour, the first calculus acting as the universe for the mathematical definition
of concepts pertaining to proof search (e. g., the existence of solutions for a given logical sequent),
the second calculus acting as the finitary setting where algorithmic counterparts of those concepts
can be found; (iii) formal (finite) sums are employed throughout to represent choice points, so
even entire solution spaces are represented, both coinductively and finitarily.
The approach was developed systematically for intuitionistic implicational logic, delivering
new solutions to inhabitation and counting problems, and proofs of the state-of-the-art coherence
theorems, in the simply typed λ-calculus [ESMP19]. But the approach also showed to be a vehicle
for the investigation of new questions, like the various concepts of finiteness suggested by proof
search [EMP19].
The goal of this paper is to extend this approach to full (in the sense of containing all connec-
tives), polarized, intuitionistic propositional logic [Sim14, San16], and proof search in a full-fledged
focused sequent calculus. Polarized logic can be used as a platform from which proof search for
other logics is understood [LM09]. We extend our approach to polarized logic with a view to
obtaining results about proof search for full, intuitionistic propositional logic.
Coinductive proof search extends smoothly to polarized logic, with an occasional insight coming
from focusing: formal sums are not needed in the inversion phases, and the infinity of solutions
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must go infinitely often through stable sequents. Only the luxuriant syntax puts a notational
challenge, and we make a proposal for that. This smoothness is a sign of the robustness of the
approach, that was originally designed and tested in a relatively simple logic (that, however, un-
like the propositional logic of Horn clauses, has to deal with a dynamic context). As a result of
coinductive analysis, we obtain decidability of provability in the polarized logic, with our typical
two-staged decision procedure: a function that calculates the finitary representation (in the calcu-
lus with formal fixed points) of the solution space of the given logical sequent, composed with a
syntax-directed, recursive predicate that tests the existence of proofs/inhabitants.
As said, from the results about the polarized logic, we can extract results for other logics. We
illustrate the technique with LJT, a focused sequent calculus for full intuitionistic propositional
logic (including disjunction) [Her95b, DP96]. For that, we define the “negative translation” of
LJT into the polarized logic (that sees all intuitionistic formulas as negative formuals). While the
translation of formulas is mostly dictated by polarity, there are subtle problems with a definition of
the translation of proof terms without knowing the logical sequent they witness (see the definitions
of DLV(t) and atomic and positive spines in Section 3). Soundness of a translation is its first aim,
but we also need to verify that the translation gives a faithful representation of proof search in
LJT as proof search in the polarized logic. This is an interesting result in itself, and benefits from
the language of proof terms developed for polarized logic in [San16].
Plan of the paper. The presentation of polarized logic from [San16] is reviewed in Section 2
and named PIPL. Before embarking on the coinductive proof search for PIPL (Sections 4 and 5),
we show why we can study LJT via PIPL in Section 3. Applications to full intuitionistic logic are
extracted in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background on the system PIPL of polarized propositional
logic
We introduce a variant of cut-free λ±G [San16] called PIPL (for polarized intuitionistic propositional
logic).
Formulas of PIPL are as follows (unchanged from λ±G):
(formulas) A ::= N |P
(negative) N,M ::= C | a−
(composite negative) C ::= ↑ P |P ⊃ N |N ∧M
(positive) P,Q ::= a+ | ↓ N | ⊥ |P ∨Q
Here, we assume a supply of (names of) atoms, denoted typically by a—the markers − and +
for polarity are added to the atom (name) as superscripts, giving rise to negative resp. positive
atoms. The symbols ⊥, ∧ and ∨ obviously stand for falsity, conjunction and disjunction, ⊃ stands
for implication, and ↑ and ↓ are polarity shifts (as they are commonly denoted in the literature).
We call right formulas or R-formulas positive formulas and negative atoms. The set of formulas
is thus partitioned in two ways: into negative and positive formulas, and into composite negative
and right formulas. The second partitioning plays an important role in PIPL, more than in λ±G.
We also use the notion of left formulas or L-formulas: they are either negative formulas or positive
atoms.
Proof terms of PIPL are organized in five syntactic categories as follows:
(values) v ::= z | thunk(t) | inPi (v)
(terms) t ::= ⌈e⌉ | peq |λp | 〈t1, t2〉
(co-values/spines) s ::= nil | cothunk(p) | v :: s | i :: s
(co-terms) p ::= za
+
.e |xN .e | abortA | [p1, p2]
(stable expressions) e ::= dlv(t) | ret(v) | coret(x, s)
where i ∈ {1, 2}, and z and x range over countable sets of variables assumed to be disjoint, called
positive resp. negative variables. The syntax deviates from λ±G [San16, Figure 4] in the following
ways: the letters to denote values and covalues are now in lower case, the two expressions to type
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Figure 1: Inductive definition of typing rules of PIPL
Γ, z : a+ ⊢ [z : a+]
Γ =⇒ t : N
Γ ⊢ [thunk(t) :↓ N ]
Γ ⊢ [v : Pi]
Γ ⊢ [in
P3−i
i (v) : P1 ∨ P2]
i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ⊢ e : a−
Γ =⇒ peq : a−
Γ ⊢ e : P
Γ =⇒ ⌈e⌉ :↑ P
Γ | p : P =⇒ N
Γ =⇒ λp : P ⊃ N
Γ =⇒ ti : Ni for i = 1, 2
Γ =⇒ 〈ti〉i : N1 ∧N2
Γ[nil : a−] ⊢ a−
Γ | p : P =⇒ R
Γ[cothunk(p) :↑ P ] ⊢ R
Γ ⊢ [v : P ] Γ[s : N ] ⊢ R
Γ[v :: s : P ⊃ N ] ⊢ R
Γ[s : Ni] ⊢ R
Γ[i :: s : N1 ∧N2] ⊢ R
i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ, z : a+ ⊢ e : A
Γ | za
+
.e : a+ =⇒ A
Γ, x : N ⊢ e : A
Γ | xN .e :↓ N =⇒ A
Γ | abortA :⊥=⇒ A
Γ | p1 : P1 =⇒ A Γ | p2 : P2 =⇒ A
Γ | [pi]i : P1 ∨ P2 =⇒ A
Γ =⇒ t : C
Γ ⊢ dlv(t) : C
Γ ⊢ [v : P ]
Γ ⊢ ret(v) : P
Γ, x : N [s : N ] ⊢ R
Γ, x : N ⊢ coret(x, s) : R
the cut rules are absent, and the last form of values (the injections) and abort come with type
information, as well as the binding occurrences of variables in the first two forms of co-terms—all
the other syntax elements do not introduce variable bindings, in particular, there is no binding
in λp or coret(x, s). Often we refer to all proof terms of PIPL as expressions, and use letter T to
range over expressions in this wide sense (T being reminiscent of terms, but not confined to the
syntactic category t). To shorten notation, we communicate 〈t!, t2〉 and [p1, p2] as 〈ti〉i and [pi]i,
respectively.
We also use the typical letters for denoting elements of the syntactic categories as sorts: let
S := {v, t, s, p, e} be their set, and use letter τ to denote any element of S.
Since proof terms of PIPL come with some extra type information as compared to λ±G, the
typing rules will be adjusted accordingly. The typing relation will also be slightly reduced: it is
assumed that the FocusL-rule of λ
±
G (the one typing the coret construction for proof terms) only
applies if the right-hand side formula is an R-formula. This also means that focus negative left
sequents can be restricted to R-formulas on the right-hand side, which we therefore do in PIPL.
There are five forms of sequents, one for each syntatic category τ of proof terms (the full names
and the rationales of the categories are found in [San16]):
(focus negative left) Γ[s : N ] ⊢ R (focus positive right) Γ ⊢ [v : P ]
(invert positive left) Γ | p : P =⇒ A (invert negative right) Γ =⇒ t : N
(stable) Γ ⊢ e : A
The rules, given in Fig. 1, are the obvious adaptations of the ones in [San16, Figures 1–3] (omitting
the cut rules), given the more annotated syntax and the mentioned restrictions to R-formulas in
some places. We recall that Γ is a context made of associations of variables with left formulas
that respect polarity, hence these associations are either z : a+ or x : N (in other words, positive
variables are assigned atomic types only). The extra annotations ensure uniqueness of typing in
that, given the shown context, type and term information, there is at most one formula that can
replace any of the placeholders in Γ[s : N ] ⊢ ·, Γ ⊢ [v : ·], Γ | p : · =⇒ ·, Γ =⇒ t : · and Γ ⊢ e : ·.
We also consider sequents without proof-term annotations, i. e., Γ ⊢ [P ], Γ =⇒ N , Γ[N ] ⊢ R,
Γ | P =⇒ A and Γ ⊢ A, that we will call logical sequents. The letters ρ, ρ′ etc. will range over
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Γ ⊢ R, with an R-formula on the right-hand side. Those will be called R-stable sequents. (Such
logical sequents cannot be proven by a proof term of the form dlv(t).) Results about all forms of
sequents can sometimes be presented uniformly, with the following notational device: If σ is any
logical sequent and T a proof term of the suitable syntactic category, let σ(T ) denote the sequent
obtained by placing “T :” properly into σ, e. g., if σ = (Γ | P =⇒ A), then σ(p) = (Γ | p : P =⇒ A)
(the parentheses around sequents are often used for better parsing of the text). We sometimes
indicate the syntactic category τ of T as upper index of σ, e. g., an arbitrary logical sequent Γ ⊢ A
is indicated by σe.
We also use the set S of sorts to give a more uniform view of the different productions of the
grammar of PIPL proof terms. E. g., we consider thunk(·) as a unary function symbol, which is
typed/sorted as t→ v, to be written as thunk(·) : t→ v. As another example, we see co-pairing as
binary function symbol [·, ·] : p, p→ p. This notational device does not take into account variable
binding, and we simply consider za
+
. · as a unary function symbol for every z and every a. The
positive variables z have no special role either in this view, so they are all nullary function symbols
(i. e., constants) with sort v. Likewise, for every negative variable x, coret(x, ·) is a unary function
symbol sorted as s → e. We can thus see the definition of proof terms of PIPL as based on an
infinite signature, with function symbols f of arities k ≤ 2. The inductive definition of proof terms
of PIPL can then be depicted in the form of one rule scheme:
f : τ1, . . . , τk → τ Ti : τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
f(T1, . . . , Tk) : τ
Later we will write f(Ti)i in place of f(T1, . . . , Tk) and assume that k is somehow known. Instead
of writing the k hypotheses Ti : τi, we will then just write ∀i, Ti : τi.
3 System LJT of intuitionistic logic with all propositional
connectives
One of the interests of polarized logic is that it can be used to analyze other logics [LM09]—this is
also true of PIPL. We will use PIPL to analyze intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL), specifically
a focused sequent calculus for IPL named LJT . The best known variant of LJT is the one for
implication only [Her95a], but here we need a variant including conjunction and disjunction as
well [Her95b, DP96]. We will call our own variant LJTR.
Formulas of LJTR are as follows:
(intuitionistic formulas) A,B ::= A ⊃ B |A ∧B |R
(right intuitionistic formulas) R ::= a | ⊥ |A ∨B
where a ranges over atoms, of which an infinite supply is assumed. A positive intuitionistic formula,
P , is a non-atomic right intuitionistic formula.
Proof terms of LJTR are organized in three syntactic categories as follows:
(terms) t ::= λxA.t | 〈t1, t2〉 | e
(expressions) e ::= xs | inAi (t)
(spines) s ::= nil | t :: s | i :: s | abortR | [xA11 .e1, x
A2
2 e2]
where i ∈ {1, 2}, and x ranges over a countable set of variables. We will refer to e1 and e2 in the
latter form of spines as arms. Proof terms in any category are ranged over by T .
There are three forms of sequents, Γ =⇒ t : A and Γ ⊢ e : R and Γ[s : A] ⊢ R, where, as usual,
Γ is a context made of associations of variables with formulas. Therefore, a logical sequent σ in
LJTR may have three forms: Γ =⇒ A and Γ ⊢ R and Γ[A] ⊢ R. The latter two forms require
a right formula to the right of the turnstile. The full definition of the typing rules of LJTR is
given in Fig. 2. As for PIPL, the annotations guarantee that there is at most one formula that can
replace the placeholders in Γ =⇒ t : ·, Γ ⊢ e : · and Γ[s : A] ⊢ ·.
The characteristic feature of the design of LJTR is the restriction of the type of spines to
right formulas. Since the type of nil is atomic, spines have to be “long”; and the arms of spines
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Figure 2: Typing rules of LJTR
Γ, x : A =⇒ t : B
Γ =⇒ λxA.t : A ⊃ B
Γ =⇒ ti : Ai for i = 1, 2
Γ =⇒ 〈t1, t2〉 : A1 ∧ A2
Γ ⊢ e : R
Γ =⇒ e : R
Γ, x : A[s : A] ⊢ R
Γ, x : A ⊢ xs : R
Γ =⇒ t : Ai
Γ ⊢ in
A3−i
i (t) : A1 ∨ A2
i ∈ {1, 2} Γ =⇒ t : A Γ[s : B] ⊢ R
Γ[t :: s : A ⊃ B] ⊢ R Γ[nil : a] ⊢ a
Γ[abortR :⊥] ⊢ R
Γ[s : Ai] ⊢ R
Γ[i :: s : A1 ∧ A2] ⊢ R
i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ, xi : Ai =⇒ ei : R for i = 1, 2
Γ[xA11 .e1, x
A2
2 .e2 : A1 ∨ A2] ⊢ R
Figure 3: Negative translation
(A ⊃ B)∗ = ↓ A∗ ⊃ B∗ (A ∨B)◦ = ↓ A∗∨ ↓ B∗
(A ∧B)∗ = A∗ ∧B∗ ⊥◦ = ⊥
P ∗ = ↑ P ◦ a◦ = a−
a∗ = a◦
(λxA.t)∗ = λ(xA
∗
.DLV(t∗)) (xs)∗ = coret(x, s∗)
〈t1, t2〉
∗ = 〈t∗1, t
∗
2〉 in
A
i (t)
∗ = ret(in↓A
∗
i (thunk(t
∗)))
e∗ = pe∗q, if e is atomic
e∗ = ⌈e∗⌉, if e is positive
nil∗ = nil (abortR)∗ = cothunk(abortR
◦
)
(t :: s)∗ = thunk(t∗) :: s∗ [xA11 .e1, x
A2
2 .e2]
∗ = cothunk([x
A∗1
1 .e
∗
1, x
A∗2
2 .e
∗
2])
(i :: s)∗ = i :: s∗
cannot be lambda-abstractions nor pairs, which is enforced by restricting the arms of spines to be
expressions, rather than general terms: this is the usefulness of separating the class of expressions
from the class of terms. In the typing rules, the restriction to right formulas is generated at the
select rule (the typing rule for xs); and the long form is forced by the identity axiom (the typing
rule for nil) because it applies to atoms only.
We remark that the select rule is also found under the name Cont (from contraction) [Her95a,
Her95b]. A corresponding rule named select is found in [DP96]. The identity axiom found in
the literature [Her95a, Her95b, DP96] applies to arbitrary formulas. We could not find in the
literature the restriction of cut-free LJT we consider here, but Ferrari and Fiorentini [FF19]
consider a presentation of IPL that enforces a similar use of right formulas, in spite of being given
in natural deduction format and without proof terms. It is easy to equip this natural deduction
system with proof terms and map it into LJTR: the technique is fully developed in [San16] for
polarized logic, but goes back to [DP96]. Since the just mentioned system [FF19] is complete for
provability, so is LJTR.
System LJTR can be embedded in PIPL. We define the negative translation (·)∗ : LJTR → PIPL
in Fig. 3, comprising a translation of formulas and a translation of proof terms.
The translation of formulas uses an auxiliary translation of right intuitionistic formulas R: R◦
is a right formula (and specifically, P ◦ is a positive formula). An intuitionistic formula A is mapped
to a negative formula A∗, hence the name of the translation. At the level of proof terms: terms
(resp. spines, expressions) are mapped to terms (resp. spines, stable expressions). Definitions
like e∗ = pe∗q are meaningful if one thinks of the left e as being tagged with the injection into
terms. Use is made of the derived construction DLV(t), a stable expression of PIPL, defined by
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DLV(peq) = e and DLV(t) = dlv(t) otherwise. Its derived typing rule is that Γ ⊢ DLV(t) : N follows
from Γ =⇒ t : N .
The translation of proof terms is defined for legal proof terms in LJTR only: T is legal if every
expression e occurring in T is either atomic or positive; an expression xs is atomic (resp. positive) if
s is atomic (resp. positive), whereas an injection is positive; and a spine s is atomic (resp. positive)
if every “leaf” of s is nil or aborta (resp. an injection or abortP ). Only when translating a legal T
can we apply the definition of (·)∗ to e as a term.
Formally, the inductive definition of atomic and positive spines is as follows:
• nil is atomic; aborta is atomic; if s is atomic, then t :: s and i :: s are atomic; if, for each
i = 1, 2, ei = yisi and si is atomic, then [x
A1
1 .e1, x
A2
2 .e2] is atomic.
• abortP is positive; if s is positive, then t :: s and i :: s are positive; if, for each i = 1, 2,
ei = yisi and si is positive, or ei = in
A
i (t), then [x
A1
1 .e1, x
A2
2 .e2] is positive.
Suppose Γ[s : A] ⊢ R is derivable. If R = a (resp. R = P ) then s is atomic (resp. positive). Hence
any typable proof term of LJTR is legal. Moreover, if Γ ⊢ e : R then if e is atomic, R = a and if
e is positive, R = P .
The negative translation is easily seen to be injective. In order to state other properties of the
translation, we define the logical PIPL sequent σ∗ for every logical LJTR sequent σ: (Γ =⇒ A)∗ =
(Γ∗ =⇒ A∗) and (Γ ⊢ R)∗ = (Γ∗ ⊢ R◦) and (Γ[A] ⊢ R)∗ = (Γ∗[A∗] ⊢ R◦).
Proposition 1 (Soundness) For all T = t, e, s in LJTR: if σ(T ) is derivable in LJTR then
σ∗(T ∗) is derivable in PIPL.
Proof By simultaneous induction on derivations for σ(T ). 
For the converse property (faithfulness), we need to understand better the image of the neg-
ative translation, which we will call the ∗-fragment of PIPL. Consider the following subclass of
formulas in PIPL:
(∗-formulas) M,N ::= a− | ↑ P | ↓ N ⊃M |N ∧M
(positive ◦-formulas) P ::= ⊥ | ↓ N∨ ↓M
The positive ◦-formulas are separated because they are useful to define ◦-formulas R, which are
either atoms a− or positive ◦-formulas P . A ∗-formula N is a negative formula; a positive ◦-
formula P is a positive formula; a ◦-formula R is a right formula. The negative translation,
at the level of formulas, is a bijection from intuitionistic formulas to ∗-formulas, from positive
intuitionistic formulas to positive ◦-formulas; and from right intuitionistic formulas to ◦-formulas.
The respective inverse maps are denoted | · |: they just erase the polarity shifts and the minus sign
from atoms.
If we are interested in deriving in PIPL logical sequents of the form σ∗ only, then some obvious
cuts can be applied to the grammar of proof terms of PIPL:
• As to values, there are no z’s, and thunks can only occur inside injections, so that inPi (thunk(t))
is the only possible form of value.
• As to terms, λ-abstraction can be reduced to the form λ(xN .e).
• As to spines, the form v :: s can be constrained to the form thunk(t) :: s.
• As to co-terms, the only possible forms are abortR and [xN11 .e1, x
N2
2 .e2].
But then, values are only used in returns, and co-terms are only used in co-thunks, so those two
classes may disappear, yielding the following grammar G of ∗-proof terms :
(∗-terms) t ::= ⌈e⌉ | peq |λ(xN .e) | 〈t1, t2〉
(∗-spines) s ::= nil | cothunk(abortR) | cothunk([xN11 .e1, x
N2
2 .e2]) | thunk(t) :: s | i :: s
(∗-expressions) e ::= dlv(t) | ret(inPi (thunk(t))) | coret(x, s)
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Figure 4: The forgetful map
|λ(xN .dlv(t))| = λx|N |.|t| |nil| = nil
|λ(xN .e)| = λx|N |.|e| |cothunk(abortR)| = abort|R|
|〈t1, t2〉| = 〈|t1|, |t2|〉 cothunk([x
N1
1 .e1, x
N2
2 .e2]) = [x
|N1|
1 .|e1|, x
|N2|
2 .|e2|]
|peq| = |e| |thunk(t) :: s| = |t| :: |s|
|⌈e⌉| = |e| |i :: s| = i :: |s|
|coret(x, s)| = x|s| |ret(inPi (thunk(t)))| = in
|P |
i (|t|)
Here the type annotations range over formulas in the ∗-fragment.
A legal ∗-proof term is one where dlv(t) is only allowed as the body of a λ-abstraction. Le-
gal expressions are generated by a restricted variant of the grammar above: dlv(t) is forbidden
as a ∗-expression per se, but, as a compensation, we introduce a second form of λ-abstraction,
λ(xN .dlv(t)).
There is a forgetful map from legal ∗-terms (resp. legal ∗-spines, legal ∗-expressions) to terms
(resp. spines, expressions) of LJTR, given in Fig. 4, that essentially erases term decorations. The
negative translation only generates legal ∗-proof terms; and, since the negative translation is just
a process of decoration, the forgetful map is left inverse to it: |T ∗| = T .
Proposition 2 (Faithfulness) For all T in PIPL: if σ∗(T ) is derivable in PIPL, then T is legal
and σ(|T |) is derivable in LJTR and |T |∗ = T .
Proof By simultaneous induction on T = t, s, r as generated by the grammar G above. 
By faithfulness and injectivity of the negative translation, the implications in Proposition 1
are in fact equivalences. Moreover, we obtain the following reduction of counting and inhabitation
problems:
Corollary 3 (Reduction of problems)
1. There is a bijection between the set of those T ∈ LJTR such that σ(T ) is derivable in LJTR
and the set of those T ′ ∈ PIPL such that σ∗(T ′) is derivable in PIPL.
2. There is T ∈ LJTR such that σ(T ) is derivable in LJTR iff there is T ′ ∈ PIPL such that
σ∗(T ′) is derivable in PIPL.
Proof We prove the first item. The negative translation is the candidate for the bijection. Due to
Proposition 1, it maps from the first set to the second. We already observed that the translation
is injective. Proposition 2 guarantees that the translation is also surjective. The second item is
an immediate consequence of the first. 
4 Coinductive approach to proof search in the polarized
system PIPL
In this section, we adapt our coinductive approach to proof search from implicational intuitionistic
logic to PIPL. Due to the high number of syntactic categories and different constructors for proof
terms, we use the extra notational devices from the end of Section 2 to ensure a uniform presen-
tation of mostly similar rules that appear in definitions. Our previous development sometimes
departs from such a uniformity, which is why we also widen the grammar of “forests”. This in
turn asks for a mathematically more detailed presentation of some coinductive proofs that are
subtle but lie at the heart of our analysis. (For reasons of limited space, that presentation was
moved into Appendix A.6.)
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4.1 Search for inhabitants in PIPL, coinductively
System PIPLcoΣ extends the proof terms of PIPL in two directions: there is a coinductive reading
of the rules of the grammar of proof terms, and formal sums are added to the grammar as means
to express alternatives. This general idea is refined when applied to the focused system PIPL: the
coinductive reading will be attached to stable expressions; and the formal sums are not added
to the categories of (co)terms, since they serve to represent the inversion phase in proof search,
where choice is not called for.
The expressions in the wide sense of PIPLcoΣ are called forests and ranged by the letter T .
They comprise five categories introduced by the simultaneous coinductive definition of the sets
vcoΣ , t
co
Σ , s
co
Σ , p
co
Σ , and e
co
Σ . However, we will continue to use the sorts τ taken from the set S that
was introduced for PIPL. This allows us to maintain the function-symbol view of PIPL with the
same symbols f that keep their typing/sorting. As said, only for the classes of values, spines and
expressions, we also add finite (heterogeneous) sums, denoted with the multiary function symbols
Στ for τ ∈ {v, s, e}. The definition of the set of forests, i. e., the expressions (in a wide sense) of
PIPL
co
Σ can thus be expressed very concisely as being obtained by only two rule schemes:
f : τ1, . . . , τk → τ ∀i. Ti : τi
f(T1, . . . , Tk) : τ
coinductive if τ = e
∀i. Ti : τ∑τ
i Ti : τ
τ ∈ {v, s, e}
The doubly horizontal line indicates a possibly coinductive reading. As a first step, we read all
these inference rules coinductively, but in a second step restrict the obtained infinitary expressions
to obey the following property: infinite branches must go infinitely often through the e-formation
rules coming from PIPL, i. e., those depicted as unary function symbols f : τ1 → e (also called the
inherited e-formation rules—those for dlv(·), ret(·) and coret(x, ·)).
This can be expressed as the parity condition (known from parity automata where this is the
acceptance condition) based on priority 2 for any rule for those f : τ1 → e and priority 1 for all
the others. The parity condition requires that the maximum of the priorities seen infinitely often
on a path in the (forest) construction is even, hence infinite cycling through the other syntactic
categories and the summing operation for e-expressions is subordinate to infinite cycling through
the inherited e-formation rules. Put less technically, we allow infinite branches in the construction
of forests, but infinity is not allowed to come from infinite use solely of the “auxiliary” productions
(for τ 6= e) or the additional sum operator for e, thus, in particular ruling out infinite pairing with
angle brackets, infinite copairing with brackets or infinite spine composition by way of one of the
:: constructors—all of which would never correspond to typable proof terms—and also ruling out
infinite stacks of finite sums.
Sums
∑τ
i Ti are required to be finite and therefore may also be denoted by T1+. . .+Tk, leaving
τ implicit. We write O (possibly with the upper index τ that obviously cannot be inferred from
the summands) for empty sums. Sums are treated as sets of alternatives (so they are identified
up to associativity, commutativity and idempotency—that incorporates α-equivalence (this is still
a λ-calculus, the presentation with function symbols f is a notational device) and bisimilarity
coming from the full coinductive reading in the first step of the construction).
A rich class of examples of forests is provided by Def. 6 below.
We now define an inductive notion of membership, hence restricting the notion we had in our
previous papers on implicational logic.
Definition 4 (membership) A PIPL-expression T is a member of a forest T ′ when the predi-
cate mem(T, T ′) holds, which is defined inductively as follows.
∀i.mem(Ti, T ′i )
mem(f(Ti)i, f(T
′
i )i)
mem(T, T ′j)
mem(T, T ′1 + . . .+ T
′
k)
for some j
The intuition of this definition is obviously that the sums expressed by
∑τ
i represent alternatives
out of which one is chosen for a concrete member. It can equally be seen as a recursive definition
by recursion over T0.
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Figure 5: Solution spaces for PIPL
S(Γ ⊢ [a+]) :=
∑
(z:a+)∈Γ z S(Γ ⊢ [⊥]) := Ov
S(Γ ⊢ [↓ N ]) := thunk(S(Γ =⇒ N)) S(Γ ⊢ [P1 ∨ P2]) :=
∑
i∈{1,2} in
Pi
i (S(Γ ⊢ [Pi]))
S(Γ =⇒ a−) := pS(Γ ⊢ a−)q S(Γ =⇒ P ⊃ N) := λS(Γ | P =⇒ N)
S(Γ =⇒↑ P ) := ⌈S(Γ ⊢ P )⌉ S(Γ =⇒ N1 ∧N2) := 〈S(Γ =⇒ Ni)〉i
S(Γ[a−] ⊢ R) :=
{
nil if R = a−
Os else
S(Γ[P ⊃ N ] ⊢ R) := S(Γ ⊢ [P ]) :: S(Γ[N ] ⊢ R)
S(Γ[↑ P ] ⊢ R) := cothunk(S(Γ | P =⇒ R)) S(Γ[N1 ∧N2] ⊢ R) :=
∑
i∈{1,2}(i :: S(Γ[Ni] ⊢ R))
S(Γ | a+ =⇒ A) := za
+
.S(Γ, z : a+ ⊢ A) S(Γ | ⊥ =⇒ A) := abortA
S(Γ | ↓ N =⇒ A) := xN .S(Γ, x : N ⊢ A) S(Γ | P1 ∨ P2 =⇒ A) := [S(Γ | Pi =⇒ A)]i
S(Γ ⊢ a−) :=
∑
(x:N)∈Γ coret(x,S(Γ[N ] ⊢ a
−)) S(Γ ⊢ C) := dlv(S(Γ =⇒ C))
S(Γ ⊢ P ) := ret(S(Γ ⊢ [P ])) +
∑
(x:N)∈Γ coret(x,S(Γ[N ] ⊢ P ))
The minimum requirement for this definition to be meaningful is that the five syntactic cate-
gories are respected: if mem(T, T ′) then T ∈ τ iff T ′ ∈ τcoΣ . This property holds since we tacitly
assume that the sum operators are tagged with the respective syntactic category.
For a forest T , we call finite extension of T , which we denote by Efin(T ), the set of the (finite)
members of T , i. e., Efin(T ) = {T0 | mem(T0, T )}. Properties of special interest in this paper
are: exfinext(T ) iff Efin(T ) is nonempty, and nofinext the complement of exfinext. These predicates
play an important role in Section 5. Analogously to our previous work [ESMP19], we inductively
characterize exfinext, and we coinductively characterize nofinext:
Definition 5 (exfin and nofin)
∀i. exfin(Ti)
exfin(f(Ti)i)
exfin(Tj)
exfin(
∑
i Ti)
for some j
nofin(Tj)
nofin(f(Ti)i)
for some j
∀i. nofin(Ti)
nofin(
∑
i Ti)
In Appendix A.1, it is shown that exfin = exfinext and nofin = nofinext, in other words, we
indeed have an inductive resp. coinductive characterization, and as immediate consequence exfin
and nofin are complementary predicates.
Now, we are heading for the infinitary representation of all inhabitants of any logical sequent
σ of PIPL as a forest whose members are precisely those inhabitants (to be confirmed in Prop. 8).
For all the five categories of logical sequents στ , we define the associated solution space S(στ ) as
a forest, more precisely, an element of τcoΣ , that is supposed to represent the space of solutions
generated by an exhaustive and possibly non-terminating search process applied to that given
logical sequent στ . This is by way of the following simultaneous coinductive definition. It is
simultaneous for the five categories of logical sequents. For each category, there is an exhaustive
case analysis on the formula argument.
Definition 6 (Solution spaces) As announced in the preceding paragraph, we define a forest
S(στ ) ∈ τcoΣ for every logical sequent σ
τ , by simultaneous coinduction for all the τ ∈ S. The
definition is found in Fig. 5, where in the clauses for S(Γ | a+ =⇒ A) resp. S(Γ | ↓ N =⇒ A),
the variables z resp. x are supposed to be “fresh”, and since the names of bound variables are
considered as immaterial, there is no choice involved in this inversion phase of proof search, as is
equally the case for S(Γ =⇒ ·)—as should be expected for inversion rules.
Lemma 7 (Well-definedness of S(σ)) For all logical sequents σ, the definition of S(σ) indeed
produces a forest.
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Proof Well-definedness is not at stake concerning productivity of the definition since, clearly,
every corecursive call is under a constructor. As is directly seen in the definition, the syntactic
categories are respected. Only the parity condition requires further thought. In Appendix A.2,
we prove it by showing that all the “intermediary” corecursive calls to S(σ) in the calculation of
S(Γ ⊢ A)—which is the only case that applies inherited e-formation rules—lower the “weight” of
the logical sequent, until a possible further call to some S(Γ′ ⊢ A′). 
In general, the members of a solution space are exactly the inhabitants of the sequent:
Proposition 8 (Adequacy of the coinductive representation) For each τ ∈ S, logical se-
quent στ and T of category τ , mem(T,S(σ)) iff σ(T ) (proof by induction on T ).
The following definition is an immediate adaptation of the corresponding definition in [ESMP19].
Definition 9 (Inessential extension of contexts and R-stable sequents)
1. Γ ≤ Γ′ iff Γ ⊆ Γ′ and |Γ| = |Γ′|, with the set |∆| := {L | ∃xz , (xz : L) ∈ ∆} of assumed
types of ∆ for an arbitrary context ∆ (where we write xz for an arbitrary variable). In other
words, Γ ≤ Γ′ if Γ′ only has extra bindings w. r. t. Γ that come with types that are already
present in Γ.
2. ρ ≤ ρ′ iff for some Γ ≤ Γ′ and for some right-formula R, ρ = (Γ ⊢ R) and ρ′ = (Γ′ ⊢ R).
If ρ ≤ ρ′, we seek to transform the forest S(ρ) into the forest S(ρ′): both represent the
entire search space for solutions, and ρ′ offers extra proof possibilities just by the availability
of extra names of hypotheses that are already present in ρ. In essence, whatever is done with
such a hypothesis in the source forest ought to be done in the target forest with each of the new
names instead of the original one in addition, and this independently for each occurrence of that
hypothesis. This operation can be defined not only for some S(ρ) but for any forest T , and its
result is denoted by [ρ′/ρ]T . However, we only need to know that S(ρ′) and [ρ′/ρ]S(ρ) are indeed
the same forest modulo α-equivalence, bisimulation and our view of sums as sets of alternatives.
More details are found in Appendix A.3.
4.2 Search for inhabitants in PIPL, inductively
We are going to present a finitary version of PIPLcoΣ in the form of a system PIPL
gfp
Σ of finitary
forests that are again generically denoted by letter T . We are again making extensive use of our
notational device introduced in Section 2. The letter f ranges over the function symbols in this
specific view on PIPL. Summation is added analogously as for PIPLcoΣ , and there are two more
constructions for the category of expressions.
f : τ1, . . . , τk → τ ∀i. Ti : τi
f(T1, . . . , Tk) : τ
∀i. Ti : τ∑τ
i Ti : τ
τ ∈ {v, s, e}
Xρ : e
T : e
gfpXρ.T : e
where X is assumed to range over a countably infinite set of fixpoint variables and ρ ranges over
R-stable sequents, as said before. The conventions regarding sums
∑
i in the context of forests
are also assumed for finitary forests. We stress that this is an all-inductive definition, and that
w. r. t. PIPL, the same finite summation mechanism is added as for PIPLcoΣ , but that the coinductive
generation of stable expressions is replaced by formal fixed points whose binding and bound/free
variables are associated with R-stable sequents ρ whose proof theory is our main aim.
Below are some immediate adaptations of definitions in our previous paper [ESMP19]. However,
they are presented in the new uniform notation. Moreover, the notion of guardedness only arises
with the now wider formulation of finitary forests that allows fixed-point formation for any finitary
forest of the category of stable expression.
For a finitary forest T , let FPV (T ) denote the set of freely occurring typed fixed-point variables
in T , which can be described by structural recursion:
FPV (f(Ti)i) = FPV (
∑
i Ti) =
⋃
i FPV (Ti) FPV (X
ρ) = {Xρ}
FPV (gfp Xρ.T ) = FPV (T ) \ {Xρ
′
| ρ′ R-stable sequent and ρ ≤ ρ′}
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Figure 6: Some important cases of finitary representation in PIPL
F(Γ ⊢ a−; Ξ) = gfp Y ρ.
∑
(x:N)∈Γ coret(x,F(Γ[N ] ⊢ a
−; Ξ, Y :ρ)) ρ=Γ⊢a−
F(Γ ⊢ P ; Ξ) = gfp Y ρ. ret(F(Γ ⊢ [P ]; Ξ, Y :ρ))
+
∑
(x:N)∈Γ coret(x,F(Γ[N ] ⊢ P ; Ξ, Y :ρ))
ρ=Γ⊢P
F(Γ | a+ =⇒ A; Ξ) = za
+
.F(Γ, z : a+ ⊢ A; Ξ′)
F(Γ |↓ N =⇒ A; Ξ) = xN .F(Γ, x : N ⊢ A; Ξ′)
Notice the non-standard definition that considers Xρ
′
also bound by gfpXρ, as long as ρ ≤ ρ′.
This special view on binding necessitates to study the following restriction on finitary forests: A
finitary forest is said well-bound if, for any of its subterms gfp Xρ.T and any free occurrence of
Xρ
′
in T , ρ ≤ ρ′.
Definition 10 (Interpretation of finitary forests as forests) For a finitary forest T , the in-
terpretation [[T ]] is a forest given by structural recursion on T :
[[f(T1, . . . , Tk)]] = f([[T1]], . . . , [[Tk]]) [[X
ρ]] = S(ρ)
[[T1 + . . .+ Tk]] = [[T1]] + . . .+ [[Tk]] [[gfp X
ρ.T ]] = [[T ]]
This definition may look too simple to handle the interpretation of bound fixed-point variables
adequately, and in our previous paper [ESMP19] we called an analogous definition “simplified
semantics” to stress that point. However, as in that previous paper, we can study those finitary
forests for which the definition is “good enough” for our purposes of capturing solution spaces:
Definition 11 (Proper finitary forest) A finitary forest T is proper if for any of its subterms
T ′ of the form gfp Xρ.T ′′, it holds that [[T ′]] = S(ρ).
To any free occurrence of an Xρ in T is associated a depth: for this, we count the function
symbols on the path from the occurrence to the root and notably do not count the binding
operation of fixed-point variables and the sum operations. So, Xρ only has one occurrence of
depth 0, likewise for Y ρ
′
in gfpXρ.Y ρ
′
.
Definition 12 (Guarded finitary forest) A finitary forest T is guarded if for any of its sub-
terms T ′ of the form gfp Xρ.T ′′, it holds that every free occurrence of a fixed-point variable Xρ
′
that is bound by this fixed-point constructor has a depth of at least 1 in T ′′.
Definition 13 (Finitary solution spaces for PIPL) Let Ξ :=
−−−→
X : ρ be a vector of m ≥ 0 decla-
rations (Xi : ρi) where no fixed-point variable name and no sequent occurs twice. The specification
of the finitary forest F(σ; Ξ) is as follows. If for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ρi =: (Γi ⊢ Ri) ≤ σ (i. e.,
σ = Γ ⊢ Ri and Γi ≤ Γ), then F(σ; Ξ) = Xσi , where i is taken to be the biggest such index (notice
that the produced Xi will not necessarily appear with the ρi associated to it in Ξ). Otherwise,
F(σ; Ξ) is as follows. The only two cases where the fixed-point constructor is used are displayed in
Fig. 6. The other cases are specified as the respective cases of the definition for the solution func-
tion S (Def. 6), where the co-recursive calls of S are replaced by recursive calls of F . In all those
other clauses, there is no change in parameter Ξ. In the last (resp. penultimate) clause displayed
in Fig. 6: if Ξ = ∅, then Ξ′ = Ξ; if Ξ = (Ξ′′, X : ρ) with ρ = Γ′ ⊢ R, then Ξ′ = (Ξ′′, X : ρ′), with
ρ′ = Γ′, x : N ⊢R (resp. Γ′, z : a+⊢R). (The complete definition is found in Appendix A.4.)
F(σ) denotes F(σ; Ξ) with empty Ξ. Analogously to the proof for the similar result for impli-
cational logic [EMP16, Lemma 52], one can show that F(σ) is well-defined (the above recursive
definition terminates)—some details are given in Appendix A.5.
Theorem 14 (Equivalence of representations for PIPL) Let σ be a logical sequent and Ξ as
in Def. 13 so that F(σ; Ξ) exists (in particular, this holds for empty Ξ).
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Figure 7: EFP and NEFP predicates
P (ρ)
EFP (X
ρ)
∀i, EFP (Ti)
EFP (f
∗(Ti)i)
EFP (Tj)
EFP (
∑
i Ti)
for some j
¬P (ρ)
NEFP (X
ρ)
NEFP (Tj)
NEFP (f
∗(Ti)i)
for some j
∀i, NEFP (Ti)
NEFP (
∑
i Ti)
1. F(σ; Ξ) is guarded.
2. For any X : ρ ∈ Ξ, if Xρ
′
occurs in F(σ; Ξ), then ρ ≤ ρ′; hence, F(σ) is well-bound.
3. F(σ; Ξ) is proper.
4. [[F(σ; Ξ)]] = S(σ); hence the coinductive and the finitary representations are equivalent.
Proof The proof is by structural induction on F(σ; Ξ). Items 1 and 2 are proved independently
(the former is an easy induction, the latter needs auxiliary recursive unfolding of F(σ; Ξ) in one
subcase of each of the two context-expanding rules). As in the proof of [ESMP19, Thm. 19], item
3 uses item 4, which can be proved independently, but some effort is saved if the two items are
proved simultaneously. 
5 The inhabitation problem in the polarized system PIPL
We adapt to PIPL our method to decide type emptiness (provability) for the implicational fragment
[ESMP19]. The presentation will look very different due to our notational device. Because of the
wider notion of finitary forests that does not ensure guardedness through the grammar, some
subtle technical refinements are needed in the proofs, which will be most clearly seen in the proof
of Prop. 16, which is however only found in Appendix A.6.
We turn to the representation of solution spaces through finitary forests T and consider a
parameterized predicate EFP (T ) where the parameter P is a predicate on logical sequents. P = ∅
is already an important case, in fact the main case of interest in the present paper.
In the following, we write f∗ to stand for a function symbol f or the prefix gfpXρ. of a finitary
forest, the latter being seen a special unary function symbol.
The definition of this (parameterized) predicate EFP is inductive and presented in the first line
of Fig. 7, although, as in [ESMP19], it is clear that it could equivalently be given by a definition
by recursion over the term structure. Thus, the predicate EFP is decidable if P is.
The following can be proven by routine induction on T (barely more than an application of de
Morgan’s laws).
Lemma 15 For all T ∈ PIPLgfpΣ , NEFP (T ) iff EFP (T ) does not hold.
Proposition 16 (Finitary characterization) 1. If P ⊆ exfin◦S and EFP (T ) then exfin([[T ]]).
2. Let T ∈ PIPLgfpΣ be well-bound, guarded and proper. If NEFP (T ) and for all X
ρ ∈ FPV (T ),
exfin(S(ρ)) implies P (ρ), then nofin([[T ]]).
3. For any T ∈ PIPLgfpΣ well-bound, guarded, proper and closed, EF∅(T ) iff exfin([[T ]]).
Proof 1. is proved by induction on the predicate EFP (or, equivalently, on T ). The base case
for fixpoint variables needs the proviso on P , and all other cases are immediate by the induction
hypothesis (notice the special case for f∗ that is even more simple).
2. This needs a special notion of depth of observation for the truthfulness of nofin for forests.
A more refined statement has to keep track of this observation depth in premise and conclusion,
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even taking into account the depth of occurrences of the bound fixed-point variables of T . This is
presented with details in Appendix A.6.
3. For P = ∅ resp. for closed T , the extra condition on P in part 1 resp. part 2 is trivially
satisfied. Therefore, we only need that exfin and nofin are complements, as are NEFP and EFP . 
Theorem 17 (Deciding the existence of inhabitants in PIPL) A logical sequent σ of PIPL
is inhabited iff exfin(S(σ)) iff EF∅(F(σ)). Hence “σ is inhabited” is decided by deciding EF∅(F(σ)).
In other words, the inhabitation problem for PIPL is decided by the computable predicate EF∅ ◦ F .
Proof The first equivalence follows by Prop. 8 and exfin = exfinext. The second equivalence
follows from Prop. 16.3, using all items of Theorem 14. Computability comes from termination
of the recursive specification of F(σ) for all σ and the equivalence of the inductively defined EF∅
with a recursive procedure over the term structure of its argument. 
As for Thm. 24 in our previous paper [ESMP19], the theorem opens the way to using Prop. 16
with P := EF∅ ◦ F , a path we followed for the decision of type finiteness for implicational logic.
6 Applications to IPL
We give a brief indication of how PIPL and its properties established before can be used to study
proof search in intuitionistic logic.
The minimum we can immediately do is to use the reduction of inhabitation problems, ob-
tained in Section 3, to show that decidability of inhabitation in IPL follows from decidability of
inhabitation in PIPL. Given σ in LJTR: σ is inhabited in LJTR iff σ
∗ is inhabited in PIPL (Cor. 3);
iff exfin(S(σ∗)) (Prop. 8 and exfin = exfinext); iff EF∅(F(σ
∗)) (Thm. 17).
The obtained algorithm is thus EF∅(F(σ
∗)). It is a two-stage process. First, F calculates the
representation of the full solution space; second the predicate EF∅(·.) does the specific decision.
Despite elegance, the obtained procedure, of course, does not give a competitive algorithm to
decide full IPL, because its first stage is not optimized. Also, note that if only decision of IPL
is sought, variants of LJT like the systems MJHist [How98] or Nbu [FF19] offer a base for more
efficient decision, as, in particular, context-expanding rules are blocked when the formula to be
added to the context is already in there (like in total discharge convention). On the other hand,
in view of the Curry-Howard isomorphism, one often asks for more information about the set of
inhabitants (such as cardinality at most 1, finiteness, enumeration), and our current setting is
ready to accommodate such questions. This can be done in two ways: either continuing to work
through PIPL, or by translating the key tools, infinitary and finitary representations of the solution
space of LJTR, once and for all in terms entirely contained in LJTR. We sketch how the latter
can be done.
Let LJT coΣ (resp. LJT
gfp
Σ ) be the system whose forests (resp. finitary forests) are obtained by
extending the grammar of proof terms of LJTR with sums (resp. sums, the fixed-point construction
and fixed-point variables) for categories τ ∈ {e, s} (resp. τ ∈ {e}), similarly to the extensions of
PIPL to PIPLcoΣ and PIPL
gfp
Σ (including the precise reading of the grammars of forests, which in this
case requires that infinite branches go infinitely often through inherited e-formation rules. For the
help of the reader, the grammar obtained for LJT gfpΣ is presented in Appendix A.7.
For a logical sequent σ and a vector of declarations Ξ =
−−−→
X : ρ in LJTR, let S(σ) (resp. F(σ; Ξ))
be the LJT coΣ -forest (resp. LJT
gfp
Σ -finitary forest) resulting from the compositions |S(σ
∗)| (resp.
|F(σ∗; Ξ∗)|), where the forgetful maps are extended from legal ∗-proof terms in the obvious way (in
particular, |
∑
i Ti| =
∑
i |Ti|, |X
ρ∗ | = Xρ, |gfpXρ
∗
.T | = gfpXρ.|T |). As before, F(σ) = F(σ; ∅) is
a well-defined function. The result of calculating F(σ; Ξ), for Ξ :=
−−−−→
Xi : ρi, is the following: If for
some i, ρi =: (Γi ⊢ Ri) ≤ σ (i. e., σ = Γ ⊢ Ri and Γi ≤ Γ), then F(σ; Ξ) = Xσi , where i is taken
to be the biggest such index; otherwise, the specification is found in Fig. 8 (and, for space reasons,
in Appendix A.7), where Ξ′ (occurring once in the first clause and twice in the last clause) is given
resp. by: if Ξ = ∅, then Ξ′ = Ξ; if Ξ = (Ξ′′, X : ρ) with ρ = Γ′ ⊢ R′, then Ξ′ = (Ξ′′, X : ρ′) with
ρ′ = Γ′, x : A⊢R′ (resp. Γ′, x1 : A1⊢R′, resp. Γ′, x2 : A2⊢R′ ).
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Figure 8: Some interesting cases of finitary representation in LJTR
F(Γ =⇒ A ⊃ B; Ξ) = λxA.F(Γ, x : A =⇒ B; Ξ′)
F(Γ ⊢ A1 ∨ A2; Ξ) = gfp Y ρ. (
∑
i∈{1,2} ini(F(Γ =⇒ Ai; Ξ, Y : ρ)) +∑
(x:A)∈Γ xF(Γ[A] ⊢ A1∨A2; Ξ, Y : ρ) ) ρ = Γ⊢A1 ∨ A2
F(Γ ⊢ b; Ξ) = gfp Y ρ.
∑
(x:A)∈Γ xF(Γ[A] ⊢ b; Ξ, Y :ρ) b ∈ {a,⊥}, ρ=Γ⊢b
F(Γ[a] ⊢ R; Ξ) =
{
nil if R = a
Os else
F(Γ[A1 ∨ A2] ⊢ R; Ξ) = [x
A1
1 .F(Γ, x1 : A1 ⊢ R; Ξ
′), xA22 .F(Γ, x2 : A2 ⊢ R; Ξ
′)]
The interpretation [[T ]] of a finitary forest T ∈ LJT gfpΣ is defined by structural recursion on
T , analogously to PIPLgfpΣ . In particular, [[X
ρ]] = S(ρ), and [[gfpXρ.e]] = [[e]]. Then, |[[F(σ∗)]]| =
[[F(σ)]] holds (for which one proves more generally |[[F(σ∗; Ξ∗)]]| = [[F(σ; Ξ)]], by an easy induction
on F(σ; Ξ)), which, together with the Equivalence Thm. for PIPL yields:
Theorem 18 (Equivalence of representations for LJTR) [[F(σ)]] = S(σ).
7 Final remarks
We extended “coinductive proof search” to polarized intuitionistic logic, as presented in a slight
variation PIPL of the system proposed by the first author [San16], obtaining the basic results about
the equivalence of the coinductive and finitary representation of solution spaces, and decidability
of the logic through a recursive predicate defined over the finitary syntax. The latter is both a
result about this specific approach to proof search, and a result about proof search in polarized
logic.
But polarized logic may also be seen as a mere platform, that is, a low-level logic in terms of
which other logics (and their properties) can be decomposed. We illustrated this view with LJTR,
a focused proof system for intuitionistic logic, and the negative translation of LJTR into PIPL.
Variants of this translation were previously mentioned or sketched [Zei08, LM09], here we give a
full treatment as a translation between languages of proof terms. By composing the properties of
the negative translation with the results about polarized logic, we extracted results about—and
tools for—proof search in intuitionistic logic (including notably disjunction). In fact, we worked
out a positive translation of LJQ [DL07] as well, but have no space to show it. This opens the way
to the study of inhabitation problems relative to call-by-value λ-terms, and for that, the results
obtained here about PIPL will be reused.
As we mentioned before, the parameter P in Prop. 16 could be set differently, to capture other
decision problems, e. g., problems involving the concept of solution rather than inhabitant. As
a further direction for future work, we plan to extend to PIPL such decidability results obtained
before [ESMP19, EMP19] in the context of implicational logic.
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A Appendix with some more technical details
A.1 On the characterization of predicates on forests in Section 4.1
Lemma 19 Given a forest T , exfin(T ) iff nofin(T ) does not hold.
Proof This is plainly an instance of the generic result in the style of De Morgan’s laws that
presents inductive predicates as complements of coinductive predicates, by a dualization operation
on the underlying clauses. 
The following lemma shows that the predicate exfin corresponds to the intended meaning in
terms of the finite extension. Additionally, the lemma shows that the negation of exfin holds
exactly for the forests which have no (finite) members.
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Lemma 20 (Coinductive characterization) Given a forest T . Then, exfin(T ) iff Efin(T ) is
non-empty, i. e., exfin = exfinext as sets of forests.
Proof Follows immediately from the fact:
exfin(T ) iff mem(T0, T ) for some T0.
The left to right implication is proved by induction on exfin. (Recall exfin is a predicate on forests,
but is defined inductively.) The right to left implication can be proved via the equivalent statement
for all T0, mem(T0, T ) implies exfin(T )
which follows by induction on PIPL proof terms T0. For the case of membership in sums, it is
necessary to decompose them (thanks to priority 1) until membership in an expression f(Ti)i is
reached so that the argument for the first inductive clause of membership applies. 
A.2 On well-definedness of infinitary representation in Section 4.1
This section is dedicated to the proof of Lemma 7.
It remains to check the parity condition. As mentioned in the main text, this comes from the
observation that all the “intermediary” corecursive calls to S(σ) in the calculation of S(Γ ⊢ A)—
which is the only case that applies inherited e-formation rules—lower the “weight” of the logical
sequent, until a possible further call to some S(Γ′ ⊢ A′).
Definition 21 (weight) Weight of a formula: w(⊥, a+) := 0, w(a−) := 1, and for composite
formulas, add the weights of the components and add the following for the extra symbols: w(↓
,∧) := 0, w(∨) := 1, w(↑) := 2, w(⊃) := 3. Then w(N) ≥ 1 and w(P ) ≥ 0.
Weight of context Γ: the sum of the weights of all the formulas associated with the variables.
Weight of logical sequent: w(Γ ⊢ A) := w(Γ) + w(A), w(Γ =⇒ N) := w(Γ) + w(N) − 1 ≥ 0.
w(Γ ⊢ [P ]) := w(Γ) + w(P ), w(Γ|P =⇒ A) := w(Γ) + w(P ) + w(A) + 1, w(Γ[N ] ⊢ R) :=
w(Γ) + w(N) + w(R). Then for all σ, w(σ) ≥ 0.
In preparation of Section A.5, we even show the following more general statement:
Lemma 22 Every direct corecursive call in the definition of S(σ) to some S(σ′) for neither σ nor
σ′ R-stable sequents lowers the weight of the logical sequent.
Proof We have to show the following inequalities:
w(Γ ⊢ C) > w(Γ =⇒ C) (the rule introducing dlv(·) is easy to overlook but not needed for the
proof of Lemma 7): this is why · =⇒ · has to weigh less
w(Γ|a+ =⇒ A) > w(Γ, z : a+ ⊢ A): this is why ·|· =⇒ · has to weigh more (and variable names
must not enter the weight of contexts Γ)
w(Γ| ↓ N =⇒ A) > w(Γ, x : N ⊢ A): w(↓) = 0 suffices
w(Γ ⊢ [↓ N ]) > w(Γ =⇒ N): w(↓) = 0 suffices
w(Γ ⊢ [P1 ∨ P2]) > w(Γ ⊢ [Pi]): trivial since w(∨) > 0
w(Γ =⇒ a−) > w(Γ ⊢ a−) is not to be shown (and is wrong) since we hit the class of R-stable
sequents
w(Γ =⇒↑ P ) > w(Γ ⊢ P ): this works since ↑ weighs more (given that · =⇒ · weighs less), but
this inequation is not needed either
w(Γ =⇒ P ⊃ N) > w(Γ|P =⇒ N): since both logical sequent weights are unfavourably
modified, the weight of ⊃ has to be so high
w(Γ =⇒ N1 ∧N2) > w(Γ =⇒ Ni): since w(N3−i) ≥ 1
w(Γ[↑ P ] ⊢ R) > w(Γ|P =⇒ R): this is why ↑ has to weigh more (given that ·|· =⇒ · weighs
more)
w(Γ[P ⊃ N ] ⊢ R) > w(Γ ⊢ [P ]) and > w(Γ[N ] ⊢ R): both are trivial since w(⊃) > 0
w(Γ[N1 ∧N2] ⊢ R) > w(Γ[Ni] ⊢ R): since w(N3−i) ≥ 1
w(Γ|P1 ∨ P2 =⇒ A) > w(Γ|Pi =⇒ A): trivial since w(∨) > 0 
It is clear that this lemma guarantees the parity condition for all S(σ).
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Figure 9: Corecursive equations for definition of decontraction
[Γ′/Γ]f(T1, . . . , Tk) = f([Γ
′/Γ]Ti, . . . , [Γ
′/Γ]Tk) for f neither z nor coret(x, ·)
[Γ′/Γ]
∑
i Ti =
∑
i [Γ
′/Γ]Ti
[Γ′/Γ]z = z if z /∈ dom(Γ)
[Γ′/Γ]z =
∑
z′∈Dz
z′ if z ∈ dom(Γ)
[Γ′/Γ]coret(x, s) = coret(x, [Γ′/Γ]s) if x 6∈ dom(Γ)
[Γ′/Γ]coret(x, s) =
∑
x′∈Dx
coret(x′, [Γ′/Γ]s) if x ∈ dom(Γ)
A.3 On forest transformation for inessential extensions in Section 4.1
If ρ = (Γ ⊢ R) and ρ′ = (Γ′ ⊢ R), then the result [ρ′/ρ]T of the decontraction operation applied
to T is defined to be [Γ′/Γ]T , with the latter given as follows:
Definition 23 (Decontraction) Let Γ ≤ Γ′. For a forest T of PIPLcoΣ , the forest [Γ
′/Γ]T of
PIPLcoΣ is defined by corecursion in Fig. 9, where, for w ∈ dom(Γ), Dw := {w} ∪ {w
′ : (w′ :
Γ(w)) ∈ (Γ′ \ Γ)}. In other words, the occurrences of variables (in the syntactic way they are
introduced in the forests) are duplicated for all other variables of the same type that Γ′ has in
addition.
Lemma 24 (Solution spaces and decontraction) Let ρ ≤ ρ′. Then S(ρ′) = [ρ′/ρ]S(ρ).
Proof Analogous to the proof for implicational logic [EMP16]. Obviously, the decontraction
operation for forests has to be used to define decontraction operations for all forms of logical
sequents (analogously to the R-stable sequents, where only Γ varies). Then, the coinductive proof
is done simultaneously for all forms of logical sequents. 
A.4 Detailed specification of finitary solution spaces for PIPL (Def. 13)
Definition 25 (Finitary solution spaces for PIPL) Let Ξ :=
−−−→
X : ρ be a vector of m ≥ 0 decla-
rations (Xi : ρi) where no fixed-point variable name and no sequent occurs twice. The specification
of the finitary forest F(σ; Ξ) is as follows. If for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ρi =: (Γi ⊢ Ri) ≤ σ (i. e.,
σ = Γ ⊢ Ri and Γi ≤ Γ), then F(σ; Ξ) = Xσi , where i is taken to be the biggest such index
(notice that the produced Xi will not necessarily appear with the ρi associated to it in Ξ). Other-
wise, F(σ; Ξ) is as displayed in Fig. 10, The vector of declarations Ξ′ (used in the first resp. third
clauses relative to co-terms) is given as follows: in case Ξ = ∅, Ξ′ = Ξ; in case Ξ = (Ξ′′, X : ρ),
Ξ′ = (Ξ′′, X : ρ′), with ρ′ = Γ′, z : a+ ⊢R (resp. Γ′, x : N ⊢R) when ρ = Γ′ ⊢ R. Then, F(σ)
denotes F(σ; Ξ) with empty Ξ.
A.5 On termination of finitary representation in Section 4.2
We were careful in Definition 13 to speak of “specification” when presenting the recursive equations.
We then mentioned that the proof of termination of an analogous function for implicational logic
[EMP16, Lemma 52] when given the empty vector of fixed-point declarations can be adapted to
establish also termination of F(σ) (i. e., with empty Ξ). Here, we substantiate this claim.
The difficulty comes from the rich syntax of PIPL, so that the “true” recursive structure of
F(ρ; Ξ)—for R-stable sequents that spawn the formal fixed points—gets hidden through interme-
diary recursive calls with the other forms of logical sequents. However, we will now argue that all
those can be seen as plainly auxiliary since they just decrease the “weight” of the problem to be
solved.
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Figure 10: All the other cases of finitary representation in PIPL
F(Γ ⊢ [a+]; Ξ) =
∑
(z:a+)∈Γ z
F(Γ ⊢ [⊥]; Ξ) = Ov
F(Γ ⊢ [↓ N ]; Ξ) = thunk(F(Γ =⇒ N ; Ξ))
F(Γ ⊢ [P1 ∨ P2]; Ξ) =
∑
i∈{1,2} in
Pi
i (F(Γ ⊢ [Pi]; Ξ))
F(Γ =⇒ a−; Ξ) = pF(Γ ⊢ a−; Ξ)q
F(Γ =⇒ P ⊃ N ; Ξ) = λF(Γ | P =⇒ N ; Ξ)
F(Γ =⇒↑ P ; Ξ) = ⌈F(Γ ⊢ P ; Ξ)⌉
F(Γ =⇒ N1 ∧N2; Ξ) = 〈F(Γ =⇒ Ni; Ξ)〉i
F(Γ[a−] ⊢ R; Ξ) =
{
nil if R = a−
Os else
F(Γ[P ⊃ N ] ⊢ R; Ξ) = F(Γ ⊢ [P ]; Ξ) :: F(Γ[N ] ⊢ R; Ξ)
F(Γ[↑ P ] ⊢ R; Ξ) = cothunk(F(Γ | P =⇒ R; Ξ))
F(Γ[N1 ∧N2] ⊢ R; Ξ) =
∑
i∈{1,2}(i :: F(Γ[Ni] ⊢ R; Ξ))
F(Γ | a+ =⇒ A; Ξ) = za
+
.F(Γ, z : a+ ⊢ A; Ξ′)
F(Γ | ⊥ =⇒ A; Ξ) = abortA
F(Γ |↓ N =⇒ A; Ξ) = xN .F(Γ, x : N ⊢ A; Ξ′)
F(Γ | P1 ∨ P2 =⇒ A; Ξ) = [F(Γ | Pi =⇒ A; Ξ)]i
F(Γ ⊢ a−; Ξ) = gfp Y ρ.
∑
(x:N)∈Γ coret(x,F(Γ[N ] ⊢ a
−; Ξ, Y :ρ)) ρ=Γ⊢a−
F(Γ ⊢ C; Ξ) = dlv(F(Γ =⇒ C; Ξ))
F(Γ ⊢ P ; Ξ) = gfp Y ρ. ret(F(Γ ⊢ [P ]; Ξ, Y :ρ))
+
∑
(x:N)∈Γ coret(x,F(Γ[N ] ⊢ P ; Ξ, Y :ρ))
ρ=Γ⊢P
Lemma 26 Every direct recursive call in the specification of F(σ; Ξ) to some F(σ′; Ξ′) for neither
σ nor σ′ R-stable sequents lowers the weight of the first argument.
Proof This requires to check precisely the same inequations as in the proof of Lemma 22. 
The message of the lemma is that the proof search through all the other forms of logical sequents
(including the form Γ ⊢ C) is by itself terminating. Of course, this was to be expected. Otherwise,
we could not have “solved” them by a recursive definition in F where only R-stable sequents ask
to be hypothetically solved through fixed-point variables.
The present argument comes from an analysis that is deeply connected to PIPL, it has nothing
to do with an abstract approach of defining (infinitary or finitary) forests. As seen directly in
the specification of F , only by cycling finitely through the dlv(·) construction is the context Γ
extended in the arguments σ to F . And the context of the last fixed-point variable in Ξ grows in
lockstep.
It is trivial to observe that all the formula material of the right-hand sides lies in the same
subformula-closed sets (see [EMP16]) as the left-hand sides (in other words, the logical sequents
in the recursive calls are taken from the same formula material, and there is no reconstruction
whatsoever).
Therefore, the previous proof for the implicational case [EMP16, Lemma 52] can be carried
over without substantial changes. What counts are recursive calls with first argument an R-stable
sequent for the calculation when the first argument is an R-stable sequent. In the implicational
case, these “big” steps were enforced by the grammar for finitary forests (and the logical sequents
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Γ ⊢ R had even only atomic R there, but this change is rather irrelevant for the proof (instead
of counting atoms, one has to count R formulas for getting the measure, but this does not affect
finiteness of it).
A.6 Completing the proof of Prop. 16.2 with extra concepts
The aim of this section is to prove Prop. 16.2. For this, we need an auxiliary concept with which we
can formulate a refinement of that proposition. From the refinement, we eventually get Prop. 16.2.
We give a sequence of approximations to the coinductive predicate nofin whose union exhausts
the predicate. The index n is meant to indicate to which observation depth of T we can guarantee
that nofin(T ) holds. For this purpose, we do not take into account the summation operation as
giving depth. We present the notion as a simultaneous inductive definition.
nofin0(T )
nofinn(Tj)
nofinn+1(f(Ti)i)
for some j
∀i. nofinn+1(Ti)
nofinn+1(
∑
i Ti)
A guarantee up to observation depth 0 does not mean that the root symbol is suitable but the
assertion is just void. Going through a function symbol requires extra depth. The child has to
be fine up to a depth that is one less. As announced, the summation operation does not provide
depth, which is why this simultaneous inductive definition cannot be seen as a definition of nofinn
by recursion over the index n.
By induction on the inductive definition, one can show that nofinn is antitone in n, i. e., if
nofinn+1(T ) then nofinn(T ).
Lemma 27 (Closure under decontraction of each nofinn) Let ρ ≤ ρ
′ and n ≥ 0. For all
forests T , nofinn(T ) implies nofinn([ρ
′/ρ]T ).
Proof By induction on the inductive definition—we profit from not counting sums as providing
depth. 
Lemma 28 (Inductive characterization of absence of members) Given a forest T . Then,
nofin(T ) iff nofinn(T ) for all n.
Proof From left to right, this is by induction on n. One decomposes (thanks to priority 1) the
sums until one reaches finitely many expressions f(Ti)i to which the induction hypothesis applies.
From right to left, thanks to nofinn being antitone, the definition above is more constraining than
the expected one that changes the index in the last clause. And already that other definition
would allow to go to the left-hand side. 
For T ∈ PIPLgfpΣ , we write An(T ) for the following assumption: For every free occurrence of
some Xρ in T (those Xρ are found in FPV (T )) such that ¬P (ρ), there is an n0 with nofinn0(S(ρ))
and d+n0 ≥ n for d the depth of the occurrence in T as defined earlier, where sums and generations
of fixed points do not contribute to depth.
Notice that, trivially n′ ≤ n and An(T ) imply An′(T ).
Lemma 29 (Ramification of Proposition 16.2) Let T ∈ PIPLgfpΣ be well-bound, proper and
guarded and such that NEFP (T ) holds. Then, for all n ≥ 0, An(T ) implies nofinn([[T ]]).
Proof By induction on the predicate NEFP (which can also be seen as a proof by induction on
finitary forests).
Case T = Xρ. Then [[T ]] = S(ρ). Assume n ≥ 0 such that An(T ). By inversion, ¬P (ρ), hence,
since Xρ ∈ FPV (T ) at depth 0 in T , this gives n0 ≥ n with nofinn0(S(ρ)). Since nofinm is antitone
in m, we also have nofinn([[T ]]).
Case T = gfpXρ.T1. NEFP (T ) comes from NEFP (T1). Let N := [[T ]] = [[T1]]. As T is proper,
N = S(ρ). We do the proof by a side induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. So assume
n = n′ + 1 and An(T ) and that we already know that An′(T ) implies nofinn′(S(ρ)). We have to
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show nofinn(S(ρ)), i. e., nofinn([[T1]]). We use the main induction hypothesis on T1 with the same
index n. Hence, it suffices to show An(T1). Consider any free occurrence of some Y ρ
′
in T1 such
that ¬P (ρ′). We have to show that there is an n0 with nofinn0(S(ρ)) and d + n0 ≥ n for d the
depth of the occurrence in T1.
First sub-case: the considered occurrence is also a free occurrence in T . Since we disregard
fixed-point constructions for depth, d is also the depth in T . Because of An(T ), we get an n0 as
desired.
Second sub-case: the remaining case is with Y = X and, since T is well-bound, ρ ≤ ρ′.
As remarked before, An(T ) gives us An′(T ). The side induction hypothesis therefore yields
nofinn′(S(ρ)). By closure of nofinn under decontraction, we get nofinn′([ρ′/ρ]S(ρ)), but that latter
forest is S(ρ′) by Lemma 24. By guardedness of T , this occurrence of Xρ
′
has depth d ≥ 1 in T1.
Hence, d+ n′ ≥ 1 + n′ = n.
Case T = f(T1, . . . , Tk) with a proper function symbol f . Assume n ≥ 0 such that An(T ).
There is an index j such that NEFP (T ) comes from NEFP (Tj). Assume n ≥ 0 such that An(T ).
We have to show that nofinn([[T ]]). This is trivial for n = 0. Thus, assume n = n
′ + 1. We are
heading for nofinn′([[Tj ]]). We use the induction hypothesis on Tj (even with this smaller index n
′).
Therefore, we are left to show An′(Tj). Consider any free occurrence of some Xρ in Tj such that
¬P (ρ), of depth d in Tj. This occurrence is then also a free occurrence in T of depth d + 1 in T .
From An(T ), we get an n0 with nofinn0(S(ρ)) and d+ 1+ n0 ≥ n, hence with d+ n0 ≥ n
′, hence
n0 is as required for showing An′(Tj).
Case T =
∑
i Ti. NEFP (T ) comes from NEFP (Ti) for all i. Assume n ≥ 0 such that An(T ). We
have to show that nofinn([[T ]]). This is trivial for n = 0. Thus, assume n = n
′ + 1 and fix some
index i. We have to show nofinn([[Ti]]). We use the induction hypothesis on Ti (with the same
index n). Therefore, we are left to show An(Ti). Consider any free occurrence of some X
ρ in Ti
such that ¬P (ρ), of depth d in Ti. This occurrence is then also a free occurrence in T of depth d
in T . From An(T ), we get an n0 with nofinn0(S(ρ)) and d + n0 ≥ n, hence n0 is as required for
showing An(Ti). (Of course, it is important that sums do not count for depth in finitary terms if
they do not count for the index of the approximations to nofin. Therefore, this proof case is so
simple.) 
We return to Prop. 16.2:
Proof Let T ∈ PIPLgfpΣ be well-bound, proper and guarded, assume NEFP (T ) and that for all
Xρ ∈ FPV (T ), exfin(S(ρ)) implies P (ρ). We have to show nofin([[T ]]). By Lemma 28 it suffices to
show nofinn([[T ]]) for all n. Let n ≥ 0. By the just proven refinement, it suffices to show An(T ).
Consider any free occurrence of some Xρ in T such that ¬P (ρ), of depth d in T . By contraposition
of the assumption on FPV (T ) and by the complementarity of nofin and exfin, we have nofin(S(ρ)),
hence by Lemma 28 nofinn(S(ρ)), and d+ n ≥ n, as required for An(T ). 
A.7 Details on finitary representation for LJTR in Section 6
The grammar obtained for LJT gfpΣ as described in the text is:
(terms) t ::= λxA.t | 〈t1, t2〉 | e
(stable expressions) e ::= xs | inAi (t) |
∑
i ei |X
ρ | gfpXρ.e
(spines) s ::= nil | t :: s | i :: s | abortR | [xA11 .e1, x
A2
2 e2] |
∑
i si
We now give the omitted cases of the specification of F(σ; Ξ), i. e., those that have to be added
to Fig. 8.
F(Γ =⇒ A1 ∧ A2; Ξ) = 〈F(Γ =⇒ A1; Ξ),F(Γ =⇒ A2; Ξ)〉
F(Γ =⇒ R; Ξ) = F(Γ ⊢ R; Ξ)
F(Γ[A ⊃ B] ⊢ R; Ξ) = F(Γ =⇒ A; Ξ) :: F(Γ[B] ⊢ R; Ξ)
F(Γ[A1 ∧ A2] ⊢ R; Ξ) =
∑
i∈{1,2}(i :: F(Γ[Ai] ⊢ R; Ξ))
F(Γ[⊥] ⊢ R; Ξ) = abortR
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